This paper discusses the practical implementation of a novel security tool termed SIMPL system, which was introduced in [1] . SIMPL systems can be regarded as a public key version of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Like the latter, a SIMPL system S is physically unique and nonreproducible, and implements an individual function F S . In opposition to a PUF, however, a SIMPL system S possesses a publicly known numerical description, which allows its digital simulation and prediction. At the same time, any such simulation must work at a detectably lower speed than the real-time behavior of S. As argued in [1], SIMPL systems have certain practicality and security advantages in comparison to PUFs, certificates of authenticity, physically obfuscated keys, and also to standard mathematical cryptotechniques.
Introduction
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a relatively young, emerging cryptographic primitive [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . However, one potential downside of PUF-based protocols is that they usually require a previously shared piece of information (typically some challenge-response-pairs) that was established in a joint set-up phase between the communicants. Alternatively, an online connection to a trusted authority at the time of the protocol execution must be employed. In this particular structural aspect, PUFs are resemblant of classical private key systems.
In this paper, we are concerned with an alternative security tool called SIMPL systems, which is a public key version of standard PUFs. SIMPL systems have been introduced in [1] . The acronym SIMPL stands for "SIMulation Possible, but Laborious", and hints at the critical security feature of these structures. A physical system S is called a SIMPL system if the following holds:
1. It is possible for everyone to numerically simulate and, thus, to predict the physical behaviour of S with very high accuracy. The basis of the simulation is an individual description D(S) of S, and a generic simulation algorithm Sim, which are both publicly known.
Definition of SIMPL Systems
The following definition of SIMPL systems has been provided in [1] .
Definition 3.1 ((t C , t P h , )-SIMPL Systems). Let S be a physical system mapping challenges C i to responses R i , with C denoting the finite set of all possible challenges. Let furthermore t max be the maximum time (over all challenges C i ∈ C) which it takes until the system has generated the corresponding response R i . S is called a (t C , t P h , )-SIMPL system if there is a numerical string D(S), called the description of S, and a generic computer algorithm Sim such that the following conditions are met:
1. For all challenges C i ∈ C, the algorithm Sim on input
outputs R i in feasible time.
Any cryptographic adversary Eve, who is bound to practically feasible probabilistic Turing computations and practically feasible physical actions, will succeed in the following security experiment with a probability of at most : (a) Eve is given the numerical description D(S) and the code of the algorithm Sim for a time period of length t C . (b) Within the above time period t C , Eve is given physical access to the system S at adaptively chosen time points, and for adaptively chosen time periods. The only restriction is that her access times must add up to a total of at most t P h . After the access times have ended, she does not have physical access to S anymore.
(c) After period t C has expired, Eve is presented with a challenge C i 0 that was chosen uniformly at random from the set C, and must output a value V Eve .
We say that Eve succeeded in the above experiment if the following conditions are met:
(ii) The time that Eve needed to output V Eve after she was presented with C i 0 is at most 2 · t max .
Please note that the said probability of is taken over the uniformly random choice of C i 0 ∈ C, and the random choices or actions that Eve might take in steps 2a, 2b and 2c.
Some remarks on the definition are in order.
Security Model. Let us start by briefly discussing the security model of the definition. In practice, an adversary Eve can gather information about S in essentially two ways. Firstly computationally, by analyzing challenge-response-pairs (C i , R i ) and by analyzing the algorithm Sim and the description D(S). The CRPs may either stem from eavesdropping on protocols, or they may be computed by the adversary hinself via the algorithm Sim and the description D(S). These possibilities are reflected in item 2a of the definition. Secondly, Eve may physically measure arbitrary features of the system S at some point. For example, she might try to obtain some physical characteristics or internal parameters of the system which are not easily deducable from knowing many CRPs, but which could speed up her simulation. This possibility is covered in item 2b. The model tries to reflect real-world situations, for example if S was used in mobile systems for identification purposes.
Immunity against Full Read-Out. It follows from Definition 3.1 that for any SIMPL system S, it must be impossible to measure the values R i for all possible parameters C i ∈ C within the timeframe t P h . Otherwise, Eve could create an exhaustive lookup-table for all possible values R i during step 2b, which would enable her to succeed in the described experiment. Hence, for any SIMPL system either the set of possible measurement parameters C must be very large (for example exponential in some system parameter) and/or successive read-outs can only be carried out relatively slowly.
Immunity Against Cloning. Please note further that Definition 3.1 implies that previous physical access and a number of known Challenge-Response-Pairs of S must not enable Eve to do one of the following:
1. Build an exact physical clone S of the system S, for which
and for which the evaluation of the R i works comparably quickly as by an experiment on S.
2. Build a functional physical clone S of S, which may be a physical system of a possibly very different structure or different lengthscales than S, that enables Eve to determine the values R i for (almost) all C i ∈ C correctly and comparably quickly as by experiment on S.
3. Build a digital clone, which is a computer algorithm Alg that numerically computes the values
for (almost) all C i ∈ C comparably quickly as by an experiment on S.
The inability for digital cloning implies a number of non-trivial requirements: Firstly, it logically includes the immunity against full read-out that we discussed earlier. Secondly, it implies that the behaviour of S cannot be learned by a machine learning algorithm that has a very rapid prediction phase, which works on a comparable timescales as the real-time behavior of S. Thirdly, and most generally, it implies that the simulation of S on the basis of D(S) cannot be split into a possibly laborious precomputation phase independent of a concrete challenge, and a specific computation phase that very rapidly determines R i once C i is given.
In the sequel, we will sometimes refer to the immunity of S against cloning also as the unreproducibility or the uniqueness of S.
Different Adversarial Scenarios. The definition leaves to some extent open which specific resources Eve may employ during her attack. There are several meaningful scenarios, leading to different security notions.
1. Consumer Security: Eve is assumed to be a private person, possibly very educated in cryptographic and security matters, but with a budget not exceeding one million dollars.
Organization Security:
Eve is an organization with very strong financial resources, possibly up to billions of Dollars, but with some significant constraints concerning impending legal prosecution.
3. Technological Security: We assume that Eve is allowed to use basically unlimited fincancial resources, and faces no restrictions other than those induced by current technology.
When we say that a SIMPL system is secure in one of the above scenarios, we mean that it remains secure in the sense of Definition 3.1 if Eve is allowed the described resources. Which type of security we seek strongly depends on the intended application. A SIMPL system that is not technologically secure, but consumer secure might still find very fruitful applications in the consumer market. One should have this fact in mind, and not aim for technological security only when designing SIMPL systems.
For a full discussion of the definition and the underlying adversarial model, see [1] . In particular, we argue in this reference why the usual distinction between polynomial and exponential time should not be applied in the definition of SIMPL systems, which only allows us to employ seemingly handwaving notions like "practically feasible" or "infeasible". In particular, there is no formal "computational" model at hand which could help us to formalize Eve's physical actions during her physical access periods t P h .
Protocols and Applications
We will now quote one exemplary protocol that can be realized by SIMPL systems in order to illustrate their working principle [1] . A few applications and the advantages of SIMPL systems are briefly discussed, too.
Identification by SIMPL Systems
We assume that Alice, who holds an individual SIMPL system S, has put D(S), Sim, t max and a description of C in a public register (we will not discuss PKI-related problems such as [10] here). Now, she can prove her identity to an arbitrary second party Bob as follows [1] : 
If this is the case, Bob believes Alice's identity, otherwise not.
Security. As usual, k is the security parameter of the protocol. In a nutshell, the protocol works because Eve is unable to determine the values R i for randomly chosen C i comparably quickly as Alice, provided that: (i) The lifetime of the system S (and the period since D(S) was made public) does not exceed t C , and (ii) Eve's accumulated physical access times to S do not exceed t P h . In that case, Eve's probability to succeed in the protocol without possessing S are less or equal to k .
Practicality. Bob can improve his computational efficiency by verifying the correctness of the responses R i merely for a randomly chosen, smaller subset of {1, . . . , k}. If necessary, possible network and transmission delays can be compensated for in advance by amplifying the absolute time gap between Eve and S through feedback loops (see discussion in section 3). Also the asymmetry between checking a solution and computing a solution may be exploited in future protocols (see section 6.3 of [1] ).
Applications and Advantages of SIMPL Systems
Straightforward applications of the above identification protcol include the following [1] :
(i) Identification of hardware and computer systems.
(ii) Secure labeling of valuable items, such as branded products, pharmaceuticals, passports, bank notes, credit cards, and the like.
(iii) Unclonable (copy protected) representations of digital content and software, digital rights management.
(iv) Tamper sensitive hardware environments.
The upside of using SIMPL systems in these situations over standard mathematical cryptotechniques or alternative approaches such as certificates of authenticity [12] or PUFs has been discussed in detail in [1] . It includes: (i) SIMPL systems do neither contain nor constitute any sort of secret binary information. This makes them naturally immune against any side channel, invasive or malware attack. (ii) They allow protocols that are independent of the standard, unproven number theoretic assumptions (factoring, discrete log). (iii) They have strong practicality advantages over COAs and PUFs, since structurally they are a public key version of PUFs. They allow new DRM in connection with TPMs, or labels that can be read out digitally over long distances, and can be verified offline at the same time [1] .
These assets make them a worthwhile target for future investigations. In particular, it would be important to find electrical, integrated implementations, an issue which was left open in [1] . Over the next sections, we will discuss two promising candidates.
Cellular Non-Linear Networks

Introduction and General Idea
A first electrical and on-chip candidate for SIMPL systems are Cellular Non-Linear Networks (CNNs) [22] . If successfully implemented, they would result in a technologically secure SIMPL system (see page 4).
CNNs are analog computing arrays with a regular, periodic, cellular structure. The cells are characterized by a dynamical state variable, and their time evolution depends on their own internal state and on the inputs from their neighbouring cells. On an abstract level, their behavior is given and determined by so-called templates, which in the simpliest case are real-valued matrices. On a circuit level, it is given by the transistor architecture of a cell, which implements the behavior specified by the templates.
More specifically, each cell is characterized by a dynamical state variable x, which obeys the following, ordinary differential equation (ODE):
i.e. the time derivative of the state variable (for the cell with i, j indices) depends on the y output of the neighboring cells (denoted by the k, l indices) via a the A cloning templates. Each cell has a bias (z) and inputs, which are coupled by the B template to the equation.
As a mathematical model, CNNs are very general; for example, cellular automata [14] can be interpreted as a special CNN which operates on discrete variables in discrete time (and where rules replace the ODE-based description). CNNs are also known to be Turing-complete [15] . CNNs often have multiple layers, and these layers are also coupled to each other via B templates.
Due to their analog and highly parallel architecture, CNNs have a remarkable computing power and efficiency. Already in 2004, a state-of-the-art programmable, commercially available CNN in a 0.35-µm standard CMOS technology exhibited peak computing figures of 330 GOPS [23] (or 3.6 GOPS/mm 2 and 82.5 GOPS/W in terms of area and power consumption). These numbers are yet excelled by non-programmable CNNs, which we propose for use as SIMPL systems. In specialized tasks, it is known that CNNs can outperform digital computers by a factor of up to 1,000 [24, 25] . CNNs are the largest analog circuits, with the CNN referred to above [23] 
A further important property of CNNs is that their functionality is especially sensitive to the inevitable variations in the fabrication process, unless special countermeasures are taken. This can make the function F S computed by a CNN S truly unique. At the same time, since CNNs are integrated electrical systems, dedicated on-chip measurement circuitry can determine the fabrication mismatches, and deliver a sufficiently detailed description D(S) to simulate F S . Such types of selfmeasuring cells are already today in standard use for calibration purposes [26] . Furthermore, it is known that there is a stable regime where the fabrication mismatches determine the CNN behavior, and where they override circuit noise and temperature variations [27, 28] . Altogether, said properties makes CNNs quite interesting candidates for SIMPL systems.
Implementation
We propose two concrete candidates for CNN-based SIMPL systems. Firstly, CNNs employed for image processing tasks [25, 30] , which are known to outperform classical architectures by a factor of 10 -100. Another attractive option is a template and circuit-design that has been recently devised in our group [29] . It is inspired by the high internal complexity of optical PUFs [2] , in whose time evolution many internal scattering components interact in parallel, leading to a high computational complexity and to laborious simulatability. Our template has the remarkable property that it effectively transfers optical behavior onto a CNN (i.e. onto an electrical integrated circuit), which then behaves quasi-optical, that is, similar to an optical system. In particular, the electrical current flowing through a certain reference point in each CNN-cell is equivalent to the local light intensity in an optical interference reference system.
The upcoming figures provide the templates and cell architecture of this 3-layer CNN, as well as simulation results that confirm the quasi-optical behavior. Figure 1 shows the templates and the interaction structure of the proposed 3-layer CNN. Figure 2 illustrates the circuit-level design. Figure  3 provides simulation data which shows the quasi-optical interference patterns in the linear (left) and non-linear/mismatched case (right). Figure 4 illustrates that local changes in the structure propagate globally. This further illustrates the quasi-optical nature and the high computational complexity of the structure: Its evolution involves many interacting subunits in parallel.
The described CNN-design seems particularly suited as SIMPL system because its quasi-optical behavior fosters pairwise interaction between the cells throughout the structure. This leads to a particularly strong, inherent parallelism, which will be costly to simulate on digital architectures. Furthermore, as we could show in simulations, the behavior of the quasi-optical SIMPL automatically shifts into a non-linear, highly complex regime through the occurring manufacturing mismatches, which can be exploited even better for our purposes. In opposition to three-dimensional optical PUFs, its description D(S) can be determined by in-built on chip measurement circuitry.
Another very important characteristics of our circuit that its behavior is sensitive, but is not chaotic. Chaotic circuits are well known [16] and several CNN templates are known to realize chaos [17, 18, 19] . The time trajectories of a chaotic system are irreproducible in a real physical environment and are hence unsuited as a SIMPL system. Security Aspects. A 100 × 100 cell CNN with our architecture leads to the following specific numbers: It requires a description D(S) containing about 10 4 · 19 template values, which is about 100 kB of information. In order to simulate the real-time evolution which the CNN undergoes in a few microsecond time frame, 10 4 coupled differential equations need to be solved (i.e., one for each cell).
Non-programmable CNNs require about 10 times less transistors per cell than programmable CNNs, and they operate faster due to the simple, resistive interconnections of their cells. By increasing the size of our non-programmable CNN, we can easily shift into regions where commercially programmable CNNs are no longer available.
SIMPL Systems from Special SRAM Memories
Introduction and General Idea
One practical and stable, but at most consumer secure SIMPL candidate will be presented in this section. It is based on a special design of SRAM memories, which we call "skew design". Its basic idea is to design the SRAM-cells such that they exhibit varying behavior in different operational voltage regions. Some of the cells (cells of type 1) will function properly over the whole operational voltage range. Others, of type 2, will possess stable read operations, but exhibit (intended) write failures whenever the operational voltage V DD is above a certain threshold. This means that in these V DD regions, the content of the cell is not changed or affected by write procedures. Below the threshold, however, the write operation in cells of type 2 functions properly. Finally, there are cells of type 3, which contain a fixed bit value (0 or 1). It has been hardwired into them already in their fabrication, and their content cannot be changed by any write operation at all, regardless of the applied operational voltage. Now, imagine an SRAM-memory M where cells of the described three types are randomly distributed or mixed. We call such a memory a "skew memory". Imagine further that on the basis of M , we build a larger hardware system S, which repeats the following feedback loop l times at maximal operational speed. Then, F S has the following properties:
(i) F S can be individualized by changing the design of the memory M . To that aim, for example memory cells of type 3 (fixed bitvalues) can be distributed randomly over the memory in a final fabrication step.
(ii) If the distribution of the cells of type 1, 2 and 3 is known, the function F S can be simulated digitally.
(iii) The simulation of F S on a standard architecture will be slower than the real-time computation of F S by S. Also configurable hardware or ASICs that are not based on a skew design will have a speed disadvantage. In both cases, the speed gap will only be a constant factor, however.
(iv) If the special skew design of SRAM cells is legally protected, then an adversary needs his own chip foundry to produce a hardware system that implements F S comparably quickly, since ordering ASICs with a skew design will be legally prohibited.
The above properties qualify S as a consumer secure SIMPL system. We will discuss the practical implementation over the next section.
Implementation
A concrete skew design developed in our group [13] is illustrated in Fig. 1a) , with width and length specified beside each transistor. The functionality of the design based on TSMC 0.18 µm technology has been succssfully verified with Spectre [31] simulations. The corresponding results are illustrated in Figure 7 . In our case, V DD min = 1.4 V, V DD max = 1.7 V , and V DD f uncmin = 1.58 V .
The memories, which will all share the same layout, can be individualized towards the end of manufacturing by fixing the content of some individually chosen cells to certain values. This means that the resulting structure will not be manufacturer resistant in the sense of [4] , but will at least require a fraudster to possess its own chip foundry. The common SRAM-cell arragement will be contained in the general simulation algorithm Sim, and the individual description D(S) consists of the cells that have been fixed to certain values. Please note that the described individualization can be carried out on the basis of a pseudorandom number sequence, which means that a short,
few-hundred bit long random seed s suffices as D(S).
The basic implementation of the feedback-loop is sketched in Fig. 1b) . The implementation of the pseudo-random generator is carried out by an LSFR, since that PRNG works very quickly. Computationally laborious PRNGs might be implemented more quickly by a fraudster, who would thereby regain some of his speed disadvantage. Please note that we do not require a PRNG with cryptographic security in this application, but merely a PRNG with a long periodicity, such that as many memory cells as possible are at least once written to or read from in the feedback loop.
The relative speed advantage of the real system can be further amplified by activating and writing into multiple word lines during one write cycle. Due to the skew design, the same value written in several lines will not necessarily result in the same cell content. Based on the simulation data we obtained, we estimate that the relative speed advantage of a SIMPL SRAM memory will be a factor on the order of 10, even compared to dedicated, configurable hardware such as FPGAs. At the same time, since all operations on the SRAM-memory are fully digital and well-defined, the content of the memory can be precisely simulated and predicted.
Compared to optical SIMPLs [1] and CNN-SIMPLs, the great advantage of the SRAM-variant is its practicality and stability. It can be implemented relatively cheaply, integrated in existing systems, and requires only very short descriptions D(S). This comes at the cost of losing their technological security, and exchanging it against consumer security (see page 4). Nevertheless, this seems acceptable in many applications. Please note that for integrated PUFs and SIMPLs, some level of manufacturer trust will always be required: It is difficult to prevent that a fraudulent manufacturer implements a PRNG with a seed known to him and distributes it to innocent customers, instead of producing a real, manufacturer resistant PUF.
Security Aspects. Let us very briefly discuss a few security relevant aspects. A fraudster who wants to imitate the skew SIMPL systems without a skew architecture has a number of basic possibilities.
First of all, he may try to implement the feedback loop in full logic, that is, without any memory cells at all. His hope may be that pure logic operations work faster than memory read and write steps, and that he can so outperform (or at least match) the speed of the original SIMPL. However, if the memory is sufficiently large, then the construction of such a pure logic will be prohibited by size and complexity constraints.
This means that the faker needs to employ some sort of memory in his attempts. SRAM memories are, in general, the fastest currently available technology, meaning that the faker should use SRAM cells, too. If he cannot rely on skew cells, one straightforward approach may be a system S F ake as described in Figure 8 . There, three standard memories M * , M 1 and M 2 and one logic block are used in order to simulate one skew memory M Skew . All of them have the same size (i.e. number of cells) as M Skew . The purpose of M * is to store the same content as M Skew during all of its operation time. The purpose of the memories M 1 and M 2 is to store the distribution of cells of type 1, 2 or 3 in M Skew . For describing the type of a cell in address ADD of M Skew , we need two bits (for the three different types). These two bits are distributed in the same addresses of the memories M 1 and M 2 : M 1 stores in ADD the first bit of the description, whereas M 2 stores in ADD the second bit.
Under these provisions, S F ake can simulate one write procedure of bit b under operational voltage V DD into address ADD of M Skew as follows: The two bits describing the cell type of M Skew in address ADD are read from the address ADD in M 1 and M 2 . They are fed into the logic, together with the operational voltage V DD. The logic determines whether a write operation under the described circumstandes (type of cell and given V DD) would be successful. If yes, then the bit b will be written into ADD in the memory M * . If not, nothing happens, and no write operation will be executed.
The described construction ensures that M * always carries the same content as M Skew would carry under a similar operation. At the same time, however, it requires more Read/Write operations plus the additional logic steps, leading to a constant speed-up factor. If also multiple word lines are activated in M Skew in each write step, this constant speed-up factor will be above a value of 2, meeting definition 3.1. 
Conclusions
SIMPL Systems are a novel security concept, which can be regarded as a public key version of physical unclonable functions [1] . Structurally, they function like a private/public key cryptosystem, with the notable difference that the equivalent to the private key is a physically hard-to-reproduce structure, which does not contain any secret information at all. This leads to critical security and practicality advances. In this paper, we reviewed the basic concepts presented in [1] , but mainly focused on promising IC-based implementations of SIMPL systems. Our first idea was to employ large, analog computing arrays as SIMPL systems. They evolve in parallel and by exchanging analog signals between their subunits, creating a significant computational power and complexity. At the same time, the arrays can be designed to strongly depend on fabrication mismatches, making the function which they implement individual and unique. As a concrete implementation, we suggested to use cellular, non-linear networks with special templates, since they are the largest currently known analog circuits with up to millions of transistors. We proposed one concrete design, and evaluated its working principle in several simulations. If implemented successfully, CNN-based SIMPL systems may eventually lead to technologically secure SIMPL systems.
Our second idea was to use special ASICs as SIMPL systems, whose circuit design implements one specific digital function more efficiently than a standard architecture. The resulting circuits can be made stable and cheap. At the same time, however, this approach can at most result in consumer secure SIMPL systems, since fabricaton tolerances play no role. One particular problem is that fraudsters may try to order ASICs with the same design as the original SIMPL system at chip foundries. This may, in principle, be prevented by legal restriction.
However, a general problem is that fraudsters can order ASICs not with an identical, but with an effectively equivalent design. Since the equivalence of Boolean functions is co-NP-complete, there is no generic method for the chip foundries to notice the design equivalence. We believe that our skew design can help us to circumvent this problem, since any equivalent function seems to require the use of skew memory cells in their design. The occurence of this particular design unit can be checked relatively easily. Furthermore, it seems that skew cells have no practical applications apart from serving as SIMPL systems, whence their prohibition/restriction does not harm other implementations.
Overall, our studies have not yet matured to a level where we can claim a full successful proof of concept. But they do seem to provide an interesting first step towards the realization of electrical integrated SIMPL systems, and can also serve as a confirmation for the general feasibility of SIMPL systems as a new security tool.
